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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bennett Scales appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion to recess his trial. That motion was made at four in the 
afternoon on the first day of a trial set for one to two days so that he could compose 
himself and finalize an appropriate testimony strategy, which includes careful 
consideration of whether to testify on his own behalf at all. The district court denied that 
request because "[t]his is the day set for trial, so we need to proceed." (Tr., p.169, Ls.9-
·10.) That decision constitutes an inappropriate, "myopic insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay," Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 
U.S. 575, 589 (1964 ), and it eviscerated several of Mr. Scales' constitutional rights, 
including the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard and present testimony on his own behalf. Therefore, this Court 
should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Scales with felony domestic violence. (R., pp.32-33.) 
Mr. Scales exercised his right to a jury trial. The district court and counsel anticipated 
that the trial could extend into a second day, and the district court told the jury so at the 
outset of the proceedings. (Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.3; Tr., p.10, L.5-6.) The district court 
also informed the jury that it would not require that they stay beyond normal business 
hours, but they could elect to do so if they were in the middle of the deliberation 
process. (Tr., p.63, Ls.12-24.) 
During the trial, the alleged victim, S.J., testified that she and Mr. Scales were 
having a heated argument and she had told him to leave their home. She also testified 
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that, while Mr. Scales was standing behind her, he hit her with an open palm with 
sufficient force to break her nose in multiple places. (Tr., p.100, Ls.1-2 (S.J.'s testimony 
about how Mr. Scales purportedly struck her); Tr., p.120, L.11 - p.123, L.13) 
(Dr. Howard Schaff testifying about the extent of the injuries to S.J.'s nose).) S.J.'s 
mother, Kimberli Willis, also testified that she saw Mr. Scales slap S.J.. (Tr., p.130, 
Ls.3-5.) The State also admitted recordings of telephone conversations which 
contained concessions to the act by Mr. Scales. (See Tr., p.159, L.9 - p.164, L.21.) 
The State rested its case at approximately four o'clock in the afternoon. (See Tr., 
p.168,L.19.) 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel indicated that Mr. Scales 
intended to take the stand and testify in his own defense. (Tr., p.165, Ls.18-25.) 
Mr. Scales was the only witness anticipated by defense counsel. (Tr., p.165, L.25.) 
However, Mr. Scales requested that the district court recess the trial until the following 
morning. (Tr., p.168, Ls.22-23.) Defense counsel acknowledged that Mr. Scales was a 
bit emotional. (Tr., p.167, L.1.) The district court gave Mr. Scales five minutes to 
discuss the issue of his testimony with counsel, and at the same time, asked counsel to 
consider whether there were any additional instructions that he would like the court to 
give the jury. (Tr., p.167, L.16 - p.168, L.15.) 
Upon returning from that recess, Mr. Scales explained that he felt like, though he 
wanted to testify, he was being rushed, and was concerned that, without adequate time 
to gather himself, his testimony would be more problematic than beneficial to his case: 
"I'm being pushed a little too quickly here .... if this all goes wrong, I'm the one that 
goes out [of] here and sits [in prison]." (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-13.) The district court denied 
that motion because "[t]his is the day set for trial, so we need to proceed." (Tr., p.169, 
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Ls.9-1 O; see also Tr., p.170, Ls.6-7; Tr., p.171, L.7.) Based on the district court's denial 
of his request for a recess, Mr. Scales did not testify. (Tr., p.169, Ls.3-6.) 
The jury found Mr. Scales guilty as charged. (R., p.76.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.81-82.) 




Whether the district court abused its discretion, promoting a myopic insistence on 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for a recess, and in so doing, 
eviscerated several of Mr. Scales' constitutional rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Promoting A Myopic Insistence On 
Expeditiousness In The Face Of A Justifiable Request For A Recess, And In So Doing, 
Eviscerated Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights 
A. The District Court's Decision To Deny The Requested Recess Constituted An 
Abuse Of Its Discretion 
As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out: 
The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial 
judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates 
due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to 
defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the 
right to defend with counsel an empty formality. 
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673,675 (Ct. App. 
1990). Generally, the denial of a motion for continuance is not an abuse of discretion 
unless the appellant demonstrates that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the 
denial of that motion. State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 449 (1973) (quoting State v. 
Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202 (1971 )). Whether the denial of a motion for continuance is so 
arbitrary as to violate the defendant's constitutional rights depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, as well as the rationales forwarded by the 
defendant in support of his motion. Ungar, 376, U.S. at 589. 
To that end, Idaho's appellate courts have identified several factors that an 
appellate court might consider in reviewing a denial of a motion for continuance: (1) the 
timing of the motion; (2) the requested length of delay, including whether the delay is an 
attempt to manipulate the proceedings; (3) the number, if any, of similar continuances 
sought by the defendant; (4) the inconvenience to witnesses; and (5) any prejudice to 
the prosecution. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 555-56 (1993); State v. Carman, 114 
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Idaho 791, 793 (Ct. App. 1988).1 In Pratt, the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that 
there was no evidence that the defendant was trying to manipulate the proceedings, he 
had not previously requested a continuance, and there was no finding regarding any 
potential inconvenience to witnesses or prejudice to the prosecution. Pratt, 125 Idaho 
at 556. The only reason the district court gave for denying the requested continuance 
was the "administrative gymnastics" it had to perform in order to calendar the hearing, 
and that it had not been made aware that the defendant was seeking to retain private 
counsel before that hearing. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "[f]rom the 
record, it is clear that the magistrate should have granted Pratt's motion for a 
continuance. The magistrate's reasons for denying the continuance . . . when 
considered in light of the above-quoted factors, amount to an unreasoning and arbitrary 
insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable delay."2 Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, a consideration of the factors identified in Pratt and Carman 
demonstrate that, as in Pratt, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion 
to request. The timing of the motion demonstrates the request was reasonable. The 
motion was made at the end of the first day of trial, upon the conclusion of the State's 
case-in-chief. (See generally Tr., pp.165-71.) At that point, it was 3:55 in the afternoon. 
(See Tr., p.168, L.19.) Counsel had already told the district court that the case could 
1 The courts in Pratt and Carman identified other factors that addressed the specific 
issue in those cases - whether new counsel should have been appointed - but those 
factors are not relevant to the issue in this case. See Pratt, 125 Idaho at 555; Carman, 
114 Idaho at 793. 
2 The reason that the Idaho Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of 
conviction in Pratt, despite the erroneous denial of the motion for continuance, was that 
the motion arose during the preliminary hearing. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556. Since the 
Court concluded that the subsequent trial was fair, it held that the error did not justify 
vacating the judgment of conviction. Id. 
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require more than one day to complete, and the court had relayed that information to 
the jury. (Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.3; Tr., p.10, L.5-6.) The district court had also told the 
jurors that they did not have to stay past normal business hours, but could elect to do so 
if they were in the middle of the deliberation process. (Tr., p.63, Ls.12-24.) Thus, the 
timing of the motion demonstrates that the request was reasonable, since it was made 
at the end of the State's case, only one hour before the end of normal office hours, and 
would not delay the trial beyond its expected duration. 
The requested length of delay was also reasonable. Mr. Scales simply 
requested to be allowed to present his case, namely his testimony, the following 
morning. (Tr., p.166, Ls.22-23.) That was within the anticipated duration of the trial. 
(See Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.3; Tr., p.10, Ls.5-6.) That also demonstrates that he was not 
trying to manipulate the proceedings.3 In that same regard, Mr. Scales had not 
requested any prior continuances or recesses during the trial. (See generally R.) In 
fact, he had only requested one continuance during the pendency of the case - from the 
initial setting of the preliminary hearing for a period of four days, at which point, the 
preliminary hearing proceeded. (R., pp.20, 28.) There was no evidence that granting 
the requested recess would inconvenience any witnesses because the State had rested 
its case-in-chief and Mr. Scales was the only anticipated defense witness. (Tr., p.165, 
Ls.8-9 (the prosecutor resting his case); Tr., p.172, Ls.4-5 (defense counsel indicating 
that the defense had no evidence to offer besides Mr. Scales' testimony).) Therefore, 
there were no other witnesses waiting under subpoena who could have been 
3 Notably, as the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out in Pratt, there must be some 
evidence affirmatively showing the intent to manipulate the proceedings in order for that 
factor to weigh against the requested recess. See Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556 ("In addition, 
there was no evidence that Pratt was attempting to manipulate the proceedings"). 
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inconvenienced. Similarly, there is no evidence showing prejudice to the prosecution. 
In fact, given the fact that the parties anticipated that the trial could go into a second day 
anyway, it is difficult to see how the prosecution could have been prejudiced by a recess 
within the expected time frame. Therefore, all the factors identified in Pratt and Carman 
demonstrate that Mr. Scales' request for recess was reasonable. 
Additionally, his justification for requesting the recess was reasonable: he 
wanted the opportunity to compose himself and finalize his strategy for his testimony in 
light of the evidence the State offered, rather than offer ad hoc testimony which risked 
prejudicing his case. (Tr., p.166, L.22 - p.167, L.2; Tr., p.170, L.4 - p.171, L.19.) As he 
argued to the court, "I'm being pushed a little too quickly here .... if this all goes wrong, 
I'm the one that goes out [of] here and sits [in prison]." (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-13.) At that 
point, the district court had given him a mere five minutes to try and collect his thoughts, 
much less discuss the potential strategies and risks of testifying in light of the State's 
evidence with his attorney. (See Tr., p.167, Ls.16-18.) Further, the record actually 
casts doubt on whether counsel was able to devote his full attention to that particular 
issue, since the district court also indicated it would be requesting any additional jury 
instructions after that recess. (Tr., p.167, L.20- p.168, L.18.) 
Weighing against all those factors was the district court's sole justification for 
denying the requested recess: "[T]his is the day set for trial, so we need to proceed." 
(Tr., p.169, Ls.9-10; see also Tr., p.168, Ls.19-21; Tr., p.170, Ls.6-7.) That is nothing 
more than a myopic, unreasoning, and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the 
face of a justified request for a recess, and so the decision to deny the recess was an 
abuse of discretion. Compare Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556; see Ungar, 376, U.S. at 589. 
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B. The District Court's Erroneous Decision To Deny The Requested Recess 
Prejudiced Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights 
In order for an erroneous denial of a motion for continuance to constitute 
reversible error, the "appellant [must show] that his substantial rights have been 
prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance." Richardson, 95 Idaho 
at 448; Laws, 94 Idaho 202; compare Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556 (holding that, where the 
erroneous denial of the motion to continue occurred at the preliminary hearing, the 
defendant could not show the necessary prejudice to justify vacating the judgment of 
conviction). Unlike the appellant in Pratt, Mr. Scales can show the necessary prejudice 
because the district court's decision in this case eviscerated three of his constitutionally-
protected rights: the right to effective assistance of counsel, as well as the right to due 
process, in that he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and by that 
same token, the right to testify on his own behalf. The impact on each right separately 
demonstrates the necessary prejudice to justify vacating the judgment of conviction in 
this case. 
1. The Denial Of The Requested Recess Deprived Mr. Scales Of His Right 
To Effective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords defendants the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 
(1945); see, e.g., State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60-61 (2003). The Idaho 
Constitution affords defendants similar protections. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 95 
(1996). "'[The] Government violates the right to effective assistance of counsel when it 
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions 
about how to conduct the defense."' Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989) (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). Restricting a client's ability to 
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confer with his attorney is one way in which such a violation may occur. See, e.g., 
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that the preventing 
communications between a defendant and his attorney at a time "when an accused 
would normally confer with counsel" violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); 
compare State v. Stover, 126 Idaho 258, 262 (Ct. App. 1994) (distinguishing Geders 
because the defendant in Stover was afforded "adequate time to confer with his 
attorney and prepare his defense before continuing with the trial," thereby curing the 
initial violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights). However, not every 
restriction of the ability to communicate with counsel necessarily deprives the defendant 
of effective assistance of counsel. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11. 
For example, a defendant normally confers with his counsel the end of the 
State's case, and therefore, the restriction on communication at that time constitutes 
error. Cf. Perry, 488 U.S. at 280 (citing State v. Perry, 299 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (S.C. 
1983) (upholding the South Carolina Supreme Court's conclusion that, because a 
defendant usually does not confer with counsel between the direct examination and 
cross examination of the defendant, there was no error in restricting communications at 
that time)). Since the defendant has no burden of proof, he may decide that he need 
not present any evidence at all, relying on the fact that the State has simply failed to 
prove an element of its case to win an acquittal. Contrarily, with the advice of counsel, 
he may decide it would be beneficial to offer evidence to refute a certain, particular point 
in the State's case, but not the remainder, and so, tactically limit the scope of any 
potential rebuttal evidence. So too, he may decide it would be beneficial to offer 
evidence against the entirety of the State's case. One of counsel's obligations is to 
decide tactically, which of these options is most appropriate in a given case. 
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Furthermore, if the only potential evidence is, as is it was in this case, the defendant's 
own testimony, part of counsel's job is to help the defendant decide whether, and if so, 
how best, to exercise his right to testify. Such decisions cannot be effectively made (or 
at least finalized) until after the State has actually presented its case. Therefore, this is 
a point where the defendant would normally confer with counsel. Compare Perry, 488 
U.S. at 280. As such, the undue restriction on the defendant's ability to confer with 
counsel at this time deprived him of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.4 
Geders, 425 U.S. at 91. 
2. The Denial Of The Requested Recess Deprived Mr. Scales Of His Right 
To Due Process, In That It Deprived Him Of A Meaningful Opportunity To 
Be Heard, And As Such, His Right To Testify On His Own Behalf 
Defendants have, as a result of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, the right to due process. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 551 (1979); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010). The Idaho 
Constitution affords similar protections. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115 (Ct. App. 
1983). Part of the right to a fair trial is affording the defendant with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard (i.e., a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in his 
defense). See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) ("[D]ue process 
requires, at a minimum, ... a meaningful opportunity to be heard."). "The State's 
4 When there is a restriction of this kind, the question is, as Stover indicates, not so 
much one of how long the defendant had to confer with counsel, but whether the 
defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to confer with counsel at that time. 
Stover, 126 Idaho at 262. As discussed supra, the record indicates the five-minute 
recess the district court took was not sufficient to give an adequate opportunity for 
Mr. Scales to confer with counsel on these issues. (See, e.g., Tr., p.170, L.4 - p.171, 
L.19 (Mr. Scales explaining why he was not yet prepared to proceed with his testimony, 
and thus, why the time was not adequate for him to receive effective assistance of 
counsel).) 
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obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; 
rather the State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of 
a free society, can be characterized as due." Id. at 380. Therefore, if the court's 
procedures "operate[ ] to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard," that 
deprives the party of due process. Id. As Mr. Scales argued in support of his request 
for recess, if the recess were not granted, he would not be able to provide meaningful 
testimony in his own defense. (Tr., p.170, L.4 - p.171, L.19.) As such, although the 
district court purported to still give Mr. Scales the opportunity to tell his version of events 
to the jury, its procedures, i.e., its insistence on expeditiousness, operated to foreclose 
a meaningful opportunity for Mr. Scales to be heard. As such, it deprived him of due 
process because the only opportunity he had to be heard was marred by his emotions 
and an insufficient time to finalize his defense strategy. 
By that same token, the district court also deprived Mr. Scales of the meaningful 
opportunity to testify on his behalf. The Fifth Amendment ensures that no person shall 
be compelled to give testimony against himself. U.S. CONST. amend V. A necessary 
corollary to that right is the right to give testimony on one's own behalf. Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987). When '"substantial judicial participation ... 
frustrate[s] a thoughtfully considered decision by the defendant and counsel who are 
designing trial strategy,"' particularly in regard to the decision of whether the defendant 
should testify, the court's actions violate this right. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 763 
(1988) (quoting State v. Albright, 291 N.W.2d 487,493 (Wisc. 1980)). 
Here, it is clear that the defense strategy entering trial included having Mr. Scales 
testify on his own behalf. (Tr., p.165, Ls.18-25 (defense counsel indicating that his only 
witness would be Mr. Scales); Tr., p.84, L.6 - p.86, L.19 (defense counsel's opening 
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statement, premised around the jury keeping an open mind to Mr. Scales' version of 
) However, as Mr. Scales argued to the district court, he needed additional time 
to compose himself to give effective testimony in light of the State's evidence: "I'm 
being pushed a little too quickly here .... if this all goes wrong, I'm the one that goes 
out [of] here and sits [in prison]." (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-13.) As counsel informed the district 
court: "if the court insists on going forward today, it's his position that he does now wish 
to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and not testify." (Tr., p.169, Ls.3-6.) Therefore, 
the district court's decision to not grant the reasonable request for recess frustrated the 
designed trial strategy, particularly the decision about whether Mr. Scales could provide 
adequate testimony on his own behalf. Essentially, the district court's decision left him 
with a Hobson's choice: lose the right to offer testimony in his own defense, or testify 
rashly and underpreparedly, risking prejudice to his own case. Therefore, the district 
court's erroneous denial of the requested recess also deprived Mr. Scales of his right to 
testify on his own behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Scales respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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